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B O S T O N  C O L L E G E  
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
LAW R E V I E W  
THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND OPERATIONAL 
ASPECTS EXAMINED 
PART ONE: THE CONSTITUTIONALIN AND PROPRIETY 
OF EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS 
On January 1, 1968, President Johnson signed Executive Order 
11387, "Governing Certain Transfers Abroad."l The Department of 
Commerce implemented the Executive Order the same day with the 
issuance of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations (FDIR).2 The 
Esecutive Order and the FDIR restrict the amounts of capital that 
American investors may transfer to or accumulate in foreign affiliates: 
and compel repatriation of short-term liquid balances such as foreign 
bank deposits: The Executive Order and the FDIR are based on the 
President's authority under Section 5(b) of the Trading with the 
Enemy Act of 1917, as amended.6 Section 5(b) authorizes the Pres- 
ident, during war or presidentially declared national emergency, to 
* BA., Sir George Williams University, 1959; MLitt., Dublin University, 1961; 
B.C.L., M c G i  University, 1964; LLM., Harvard University, 1965; Member of 
the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Massachusetts. 
** A.B., Princeton University, 1963; LLB., Harvard University, 1967; Member of 
the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Massachusetts. 
1 Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 CE.R. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. 3 95(a) (Supp. IV, 
1969). 
2 15 C.F.R. 88 1000.101-.I301 (Supp. 1969), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 806 (1968). 
For a detailed discussion of the application of the FDIR see 'Tart Two: Operational 
Aspects of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations," infra p. 175. 
3 Exec. Order No. 11387(1) (a), 3 CER. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. 8 95(a) (Supp. 
IV, 1969) ; 15 C3.R. 1000.201 (1969). 
4 Id. 
6 12 U.S.C. 3 95(a) (1964). 
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regulate trade and financial transactions between Americans and 
foreign persons? 
Section 5 (b) and subsequent amendments to it authorize regula- 
tions only in response to conditions of extreme emergency? The pri- 
mary purpose of the FDIR is to reduce the American balance of 
payments deficiL8 However, the continued tolerance of that deficit 
by Congress and the President for several years prior to the issuance 
of the FDIR, indicates that the deficit itself cannot be regarded as 
a national emergency of sufficient magnitude to warrant the invoca- 
tion of the President's section 5(b) powers. In  recognition of this, 
the President justified the Executive Order by citing the continued 
existence of the national emergency declared by President Truman 
in 1950, in response to both the invasion of Korea by Communist 
China and the dangers of communist aggression (the Korean emer- 
gency)? But clearly by 1968 the Korean War was over and fhe dan- 
gers of communist aggression were not nearly as imminent as they 
had been in 1950. Thus, the propriety and, indeed, the constitutional 
validity of basing the FDIR on a national emergency declared in re- 
6 Section S(b), as amended, reads in part: 
(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency 
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may 
designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may pre- 
scribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise- 
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, 
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institu- 
tion, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold 
or silver coin or bullion, currency, or securities, and 
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and coinpel, nullify, void, prevent or pro- 
hibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, \vithdra\vd, transporta- 
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or mercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving any property in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. 
1 2  U.S.C. 5 9S (a) (1) (A) -(B) (1964). 
7 See Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1,s 2, 48 Stat. 1. 
8 Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 C.F.R. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. 5 9S(a) (Supp. N, 
1969). 
9 Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-531, 50 U.S.C. App. (notes pre- 
ceding 5 1) (1964). The prologue to the Proclamation reads in part: 
[Rlecent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the 
peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the 
United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict . . . . 
~IWlorld conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of 
aggression that have been loosed upon the world. . . . 
[Tlhe increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires 
that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as 
possible . . . . 
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson noted the continuance of this emergency 
in their executive orders. Exec. Order No. 10896, 3 C.F.R. 425 (Comp. 1959-63); 
Exec. Order No. 10905, 3 C.F.R. 436 (Comp. 1959-63) ; Exec. Order No. 11037, 3 C3.R. 
621 (Comp. 1959-63), 12 U.S.C. 5 %(a) (1964); Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 C.F.R. 90 
(Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. 5 95(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). 
144 
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sponse to an international situation which no longer existed were 
seriously questioned at  the time.1° Moreover, President Nixon's recent 
statements that the United States and the communist nations can 
and must live together in harmony is further indication that the as- 
sumptions underlying the declaration of the Korean emergency are 
no longer valid, and that its continued use as support for the FDIR 
is of dubious propriety.ll 
- - - - - - - - - -- - - 
10 See, e.g., Address by Russell Baker, American Management Association Meeting, 
April 8-10, 1968, in CCH Balance of Payments Rep. 11 9032. 
11 The FDIR are not the only regulations adopted pursuant to 8 5(b) which fail to 
respond to the national emergencies they were designed to cure. The Foreign Assets 
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 88 500.101-.SO9 (Supp. 1969), which prohibit unlicensed 
commercial transactions of any kind between China, North Korea, North Vietnam, in- 
cluding nationals thereof, and American persons or foreign afiiliates of American per- 
sons, block American assets owned by nationals of the designated countries, and which 
prohibit the unlicensed importation of "presumptively Chinese" merchandise from any 
country, were issued in 1950 in response to the Chinese invasion of Korea and after the 
declaration of the Korean emergency. Although justified at  the time by events in Korea, 
the propriety of their continued esistence pursuant to the Korean emergency is question- 
able. 
The Egyptian Assets Control Regulations, 21 Fed. Reg. 5777 (1956), as amended, 
21 Fed. Reg. 5861-62 (1956) (repealed 195S), which were almost identical to the 
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, were issued in 1956 in response to the Suez crisis, but 
again pursuant to the Korean emergency. 
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. $8 515.101-.809 (Supp. 1969), 
which prohibit unlicensed commercial transactions of any kind between Cuba, or na- 
tionals thereof, and American persons, and block American assets owned by Cuban 
nationals, are also almost identical to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, except for 
a limited ~ ~ e m p t i o n  i  respect of trade with Cuba by foreign affiliates of United States 
persons. These regulations were issued in 1961 in response to communist ascendancy in 
Cuba, but partly pursuant to the Korean emergency. 
A trade embargo, in the form of a prohibition of imports from Cuba, was declared 
by President Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157 (Comp. 1959-63), pur- 
suant to authority vested in him by 5 620 of the Foreign Assiitance Act of 1961. 22 
U.S.C. 8 2370 (1964). The Secretary of the Treasury issued the original Cuba embargo 
pursuant to power delegated to h i  in that Proclamation. That embargo was limited 
to a prohibition against imports from Cuba. Cuba Import Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. 
1116 (1962). It was revoked and replaced by the present Cuba embargo on July 19, 
1963. 31 C.F.R. $8 515.101-.SO9 (Supp. 1969). The present Cuba embargo is much 
broader in scope than the mere prohibition of imports contained in Proclamation No. 
3441. For example, under the present regulations the contents of a safe deposit box in 
which a Cuban national has any interest are virtually frozen. 31 C.F.R. $8 515 
.201(b) (1), .311 (1969). 
The new regulations were not issued pursuant to a new executive order or proda- 
mation. As authority, in addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, they cite 
8 S(b) and Executive Orders 9193 and 9989. 31 C.F.R. 467 (Supp. 1966). These execu- 
tive orders were issued on July 6, 1942 and August 20, 1948, respectively. In these 
orders the President delegated his powers under 8 5(b) to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. 8 6 
(1964); Exec. Order No. 9989, 3 C.F.R. 748 (Comp. 1943-48), 50 U.S.C. App. 8 6 
(1964). Thus, in issuing the present Cuba embargo the Secretary drew both on power 
delegated to him in 1962 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and power delegated 
to his predecessor during and immediately after World War I1 under 4 5(b). In 
Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), a case in which the 
constitutionality of the Cuba embargo was challenged, the court assumed that the 
145 
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When the Department of Commerce implemented President John- 
son's order by issuing the FDIR the Executive Department was 
severely criticized.la The vehemence of the criticism stemmed largely 
from the suddenness and great restrictive impact of the regulations, 
and the power of the affected interests.13 This criticism sufficiently 
disturbed Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge that he requested an 
advocate's brief establishing the legality of the FDIR. The Attorney 
General complied in a letter to the Secretary in which he concluded 
that the FDIR were "authorized by the statutory provisions codified" 
in Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act.14 
While the language of section 5(b) is undoubtedly broad enough 
to sustain, under certain circumstances, regulations requiring the 
repatriation of foreign assets and limiting foreign investments, the At- 
torney General disregarded some hard questions of law in asserting 
that the necessary circumstances in fact existed. In  particular, two 
questions are presented by President Johnson's use of "the continued 
existence of the national emergency declared by [President Truman- 
regulations mere issued pursuant only to $ 5(b) and did not discuss the authority of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
Regulations governing the hoarding of gold were issued by President Roosevelt in 
1933 in response to economic effects of the Depression, and pursuant to the national 
emergency declared by him on August 28, 1933. Exec. Order No. 6260, 1 C.F.R. 2,2 
(1933), 12 U.S.C. $ 95 (a) 1964. But the Gold Hoarding Regulations were continued 
by later Presidents, pursuant to the Korean emergency. Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R. 
948 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. $ 95(a) (1964). Neither the Egypt embargo, the 
Cuba embargo, nor the Gold Hoarding Regulations can reasonably be considered ns 
responsive to the Chinese invasion of Korea and only the China and Cuba embargoes 
can fairly be said to be responsive to the dangers of communist aggression. 
An additional question as to the propriety and constitutionality of the embargoes 
and regulations presently in effect is raised by the fact that they were issued by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. In  1942, President Roosevelt, acting within the purview of 
3 5(b) delegated his authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. President Truman, by 
executive order, reafiirmed this delegation of authority in 1948. Exec. Order No. 9193, 
3 C.F.R. 1174 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. $ 6 (1964) ; Exec. Order No. 9989, 3 
C.F.R. 748 (Comp. 1943-48), SO U.S.C. App. 3 6 (1964). From 1942 to 1948 two de- 
dared national emergencies mere in existence, a limited national emergency dating 
from 1939 to protect American neutrality, and an unlimited national emergency dating 
from 1941 in response to the emerging war. Proclamation No. 2350, 3 C.F.R. 112 (Comp. 
1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding $ 1) (1964) ; Proclamation No. 2487, 3 C3.R. 
234 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding $ 1) (1964). Both emergencies 
have since been terminated and the delegations not renewed. Proclamation No. 2947, 3 
C.F.R. 158 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding $ 1) (1964). There have been 
no $ 5(b) delegations of presidential power to the Secretary under the Korean emergency, 
and, with the exception of the Cuba embargo declared by President Kennedy, there has 
not been a delegation of the President's powers to the Secretary to effect the embargoes 
in question. Yet in spite of the fact that the power has not been formally delegated to 
him, the Secretary of the Treasury has issued the China, Egypt and Cuba embargoes. 
12 Address by Russell Baker, supra note 10. 
13 Id. 
14 CCH Balance of Payments Rep. f 9031. 
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the Korean emergen~y],"~%nd the necessity of reducing the balance 
of payments deficit during the national emergency, as authority for 
the promulgation of the FDIR: (1) Does that emergency still exist 
and (2) if so, does it justify these regulations? These are but variants 
of the more basic questions of what justifies the declaration and 
continuance of a national emergency under section 5 (b), and whether 
a declaration of national emergency under that section justifies the 
issuance of particular regulations promulgated in response thereto. 
These questions have been raised before but courts have avoided ex- 
ploring them fully and candidly.16 
This article examines the constitutionality of the FDIR and sim- 
ilar regulations issued pursuant to section 5 (b), and comments upon 
the basic propriety and desireability of delegations of broad emer- 
gency powers to the President. The development of executive powers 
under section 5(b) will first be discussed with an eye toward deter- 
mining, through the legislative history, congressional intent under- 
lying the section. The role of judicial review of the exercise of execu- 
tive emergency powers will be examined, followed by an analysis of 
the theory underlying the delegation of such powers to the President. 
Finally, the constitutional limitations on the emergency powers of 
the executive will be examined. 
I t  is concluded that, although the limits of presidential power 
are not clearly defined, the Constitution vests primary authority for 
the exercise of section 5 (b) powers in Congress, and that the President, 
particularly in non-wartime situations, exercises those powers as an 
agent of Congress. While it has not as yet provided clear guidelines 
for determining the existence of a "national emergency," Congress 
should establish such criteria, including provisions for judicial review 
of executive actions under section 5(b), so as to retain the power 
originally vested in that body by the Constitution. 
16 Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C3.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes 
preceding $ 1) (1964). 
16 The FDIR and other regulations issued pursuant to 3 5(b) have raised additional 
constitutional issues. One of the most persistent questions relates to due process con- 
siderations in the denial of authorizations or licenses. For a discussion of this problem 
in relation to the Cuba embargo, see Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 
(2d Cir. 1966). Another question arising under the China, Egypt and Cuba embargoes, 
relates to possible violations of freedom of speech and the press in prohibiting the im- 
portation of printed matter from embargoed countries. Although it  mas held in Teague 
v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F 2 d  441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 1457 
(1969), that such prohibition violated no constitutional rights, i t  seems dear from the 
principles of Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), that such mere violated. 
Justice Black enunciated this in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in the Teague case 
and pointed out that certiorari was denied onIy because the petition mas delayed beyond 
the 90-day deadline by a snowstorm. 89 S. Ct. a t  1457. 
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Originally, section 5 (b) authorized presidential action only during 
time of war. It was enacted as part of the Trading with the Enemy 
Act17 six months after America's entry into World War I. The 
Act was regarded solely as a war measure; its purpose was to pre- 
vent the use of American property to aid the enemy, and to assure 
that the debts of alien enemies to Americans would be paidols During 
World War I, section 5(b) was amended to authorize the President to 
regulate the hoarding of gold up to two years after the end of the 
WarJ9 
After World War I, section 5(b) was not invoked until President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, believing that the economic emergency of the 
Depression warranted the use of the President's war powers,2O declared 
a bank holiday.21 Since section 5(b) a t  that time authorized pres- 
idential action only during war, the President's authority for this 
proclamation was far from clear. One court commented: 
Although this section was cheerfully accepted, and even wel- 
comed, a t  the time, i t  was clearly unauthorized, since no- 
where in the Constitution is the President given authority to 
act in an "emergency" as such, and the requisite war condi- 
tions which might have called.into play his granted power 
as Commander-in-Chief or his delegated power under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 did not obtain?= 
On March 9, 1933, a t  the President's request, Congress passed the 
Emergency Banking which ratified the President's actions24 and 
amended the Act to allow the President to exercise section 5 (b) powers 
during declared national emergencies as well as during ~ a r s . 2 ~  That 
17 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. 
18 Koehler v. Clark, 170 F.2d 779 (9th Ci. 1948) ; Plfueger v. United States, 121 
F.2d 732 (D.C. Ci. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941). 
To accomplish these purposes, the Act forbade foreign trade without a license, 
provided for the seizure of enemy owned property in the United States, and authorized 
the President to regulate transactions in foreign ~xchange. 
The Act was repeatedly challenged as violating the due process and just compensa- 
tion dauses of the Fifth Amendment by authorizing the Alien Property Custodian to 
seize and hold enemy owned property with deferred or perhaps no compensation, But 
courts found that the Act was based on the power of Congress to make rules for capture 
on land and sea, a war power, and such was not subject to the ratraints of the Fifth 
Amendment, at  least during time of war. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921) ; 
N.V. Montan Export-Metaal, etc. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. C1. 1952). 
19 Act of Sept. 24, 1918, ch. 176, f 5,40 Stat. 966. 
20 See G. Schubert, The Presidency in the Courts 257 (1957). 
21 Prodamation No. 2039,31 C.F.R. f 120.1 (1933). 
22 United States v. Briddle, 212 F. Supp. 584,586 (SD. Cal. 1962). 
23 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1. 
24 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, f 1 48 Stat. 1. Congress again ratified actions taken by 
the President under f 5(b) in the Act of Jan. 30, 1934, ch. 6, f 13, 48 Stat. 343. 
25 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 5 2, 48 Stat. 1. 
148 
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legislation also authorized the President to exercise these powers 
"through any agency he may delegate.',= 
In  1940, as the nation moved toward war, the President re- 
quested that Congress further amend the section to authorize him to 
regulate transactions in which foreign countries and foreign nationals 
have an interest. Congress complied with the but the debate 
indicated that i t  regarded the amendment as a war measure.28 In 
1931, when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8785 further 
restricting such international  transaction^,^^ he again asked Congress 
to ratify his actions and to broaden the scope of section 5(b).30 It 
did so in the First War Powers AcP1 on December 18, 1941. 
Nowhere in section 5(b) did Congress define the term "national 
emergency." Some indication of its intent, however, may be gained 
by reviewing the legislative history of the section. It has been men- 
tioned that the section as originally enacted in 1917 delegated powers 
to the President only in time of and was part of a statute which 
was regarded solely as a war mea~ure.3~ When it was amended in 
1933 to delegate powers to the President during declared national 
emergencies, the debate indicates that Congress intended to act only 
in regard to the Depression emergency. The circumstances sur- 
rounding passage of the amendment bear this out. The amendment 
was imbedded in a bill reorganizing the nation's banking structure34 
which the President presented to Congress in fully drafted form. He 
requested Congress to pass the Act before midnight, when the pre- 
viously declared bank holiday would expire. Several Senators and 
Congressmen indicated that they would never vote for an act which 
contained so many objectionable provisions, of which the amend- 
ment to section 5(b) was one, but for the immediate necessity of 
meeting the crisis a t  ha11d.3~ And when section 5(b) mas amended 
20 Act of March 9,1933, ch. 1, 2,48 Stat. 1. 
27 Act of May 7, 1940, ch. 185, 3 1, 54 Stat. 179. 
28 86 Cong. Rec. 5183 (1940) (remarks of Senator Taft). 
29 Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R. 948 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. 95(a) (1964). 
80 Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 C.F.R. 645 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. 5 95(a) (1964) ; 
Exec. Order No. 8405, 3 C3.R. 657 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. 5 95(a) (1964) ; Exec. 
Order No. 8446, 3 C.F.R. 674 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. 5 95(a) (1964) ; Exec. 
Order No. 84843 C.F.R. 687 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. 5 95(a) (1964). 
31 Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593,s 301, 55 Stat. 839. 
s2 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. 
33 Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921). 
34 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1. 
35 The amendment to J(b) delegating power to the President during a nationd 
emergency as well as during mar must constitute one of the most extraordinary chapters 
in Congressional history. President Roosevelt's declaration of a bank holiday on March 
6, 1933 was based on the then dubious authority of 5 J(b). The holiday was due to 
expire at  midnight of March 9, 1933. Congress mas not in session at  the time but 
Roosevelt called i t  into session on March 9th, presented i t  with a sweeping bill dealing 
149 
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again during World War 11, congressional debate indicates that Con- 
gress was responding only to the demands of the War.80 Although 
Congress has never defined the term "national emergency," the con- 
texts mithin which it enacted and amended the section indicate that 
it intended the term to denote a crisis of drastic proportions. This 
would comport with the popular understanding of the term. 
Some further indication of congressional intent may be gleaned 
from the rationale behind the congressional delegation of emergency 
powers generally. In  this regard Professor Corwin points out that, 
whereas legislative power is fairly well defined by method as well as 
by function, executive power 
is still indefinite as to function and retains, particularly 
when exercised by single individual, much of its original plas- 
ticity as to method. It is consequently the power of govern- 
ment that is the most spontaneously responsive to emergency 
conditions; conditions that is which have not attained enough 
stability of recurrency to admit of their being dealt with ac- 
cording to rule.37 
Emergencies and crises require the ability to respond quickly and 
decisively, mith one purpose and direction, as well as with flexibility 
of method. It is the inability of Congress to act in this manner that 
necessitates delegation of power to the President in time of crisis, 
with the banking crisis, of which the amendment to 3 5(b) was part, and demanded 
passage of the unaltered bill by midnight. Senator Fletcher, who introduced and managed 
the bi in the Senate, asked that i t  be sent immediateIy to the Banking and Currency 
Committee and that the Committee be instructed to report the bill out in an hour. 
Senator Long complained that he had been unable to discover the contents of the bill 
before it was read by the clerk. Other senators complained that i t  had not been printed 
and was not available to  read. Most of the debate centered on what many senators 
thought to be unfair treatment of small state banks in favor of members of the Federal 
Reserve System in some of the substantive sections of the bill. Senator Long made n 
passing remark on the extraordinary powers being given to the President in the mend- 
ment to I 5(b). Senator Robinson of Indiana objected to a provision ratifying actions 
taken by the President "heretofore and hereafter" pursuant to 5(b), feeling that open- 
ended prospective raacation was out of order. Senator Reed reassured Robinson that 
the language was surplusage. <'If President Roosevelt should go beyond the section of 
the Trading mith the Enemy Act, the approval we are giving him would be of no 
effect . . . . CWle do not confirm and approve any future act unless i t  is in compliance 
with Section S of the Act of October 16, 1917. . . !I 77 Cong. Rec. 60 (1933). Most 
senators seemed to have serious reservations on many of the bill's sections and agreed 
they would not vote for i t  under ordinary circumstances. The bi was passed before 
midnight. Id. a t  49-67. The action on the bill in the House was similar. Id. at  75-85. 
86 In the Congressional debates on December 16, 1941, Representative Fish, insisting 
that the powers being delegated to President Roosevelt were no greater than those i 
delegated to President Wilson during World War I, said that they mere "[plowers that 
are necessary in time of war and which we would not consider giving to any President 1 
in peace time . . . that should be returned to the Congress when the war has been I 
won." 87 Cong. Rec. 9856 (1941). I 
37 E. Corwin, The President 3 (4th ed. 1957). 4 
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and may account for the fact that many of our great Presidents held 
office during crisis or war. However, once the crisis has passed Con- 
gress is again capable of responding to the policy making needs of 
the nation. Therefore, by way of defining the limits of section 5(b) 
emergencies, when Congress is again capable of responding to those 
needs the national emergency, it would seem, no longer exists. 
As the legislative history of section 5 (b) and the rationale behind 
congressional delegation of emergency power indicate, it  is possible 
to construct a method by which courts can review the propriety of 
the issuance or continuance of regulations pursuant to a particular 
national emergency. Congress delegates its power to effect remedial 
measures during a national emergency because the existence of the 
emergency makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to ef- 
fectively respond to the crisis. The propriety of presidential exer- 
cise of this delegated power, therefore, turns on whether conditions 
exist which make it difficult or impossible for Congress to legislate 
measures which will have the desired effect. Although this criteria is 
somewhat vague, it can easily be applied to those cases where the 
conditions underlying a declared national emergency obviously do 
or do not lend themselves to effective congressional action. As to 
those cases covering the middle ground, courts will, in all likelihood, 
always defer to the President's discretion in exercising his delegated 
powers, no matter how clearly developed the criteria for judging the 
exercise of that discretion may be. 
But although courts could have developed the suggested criteria 
for reviewing the appropriateness of the issuance of regulations pur- 
suant to section 5(b), they have been reluctant to undertake such 
review. The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of 
California in Werner v. United States38 epitomizes this reluctance. There 
the plaintiff sought to recover land which he had been forced to lease to 
the government a t  nominal rent during World War 11. The lease, 
pursuant to statute, provided for termination six months following 
the expiration of the World War I1 emergencies. Congress by joint 
resolution terminated several statutes, including the statute on which 
the lease was based. The expiration dates of these statutes would have 
otherwise depended on the expiration of those emergencies. The owner 
argued that the emergencies, and hence his lease, had been terminated 
by this joint resolution. The court, rather than rejecting the plaintiff's 
argument by referring to the obvious meaning and intent of the res- 
38 119 F. Supp. 894 (SD. Cal. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 52 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 842 (1956). 
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olution, developed an elaborate opinion holding that a court cannot 
terminate a presidentially declared national emergency: 
There has been no contention that anyone other than 
the President may issue a Proclamation determining the ex- 
istence of a national emergency. There is no suggestion that 
the other two branches of government, or either of them- 
judicial or legislative-may in any way usurp the duties of 
the President by declaring the existence of a national emer- 
gency. If the President is the only one who may declare a 
national emergency, is he alone empowered to terminate it? 
. . . .  
It seems to this court the determination that a national 
emergency existed is a matter of political judgment, and de- 
termination that the national emergency no longer exists is 
also a matter of political discernment, which judges have 
"neither technical competence nor official responsibility" to 
decide. If this is a matter which has been given exclusively 
to the executive branch of government and the judicial 
branch has no official responsibility therein, it mould also 
seem to this court that the legislative branch has no right 
to determine matters of political judgmentao 
The opinion was affirmed on other grounds by the Court of Ap- 
peals for the Ninth Circuit. However, the court of appeals suggested 
in a footnote to its opinion that a court, in appropriate circumstances, 
could hold that a declared national emergency in fact no longer 
existedPO The circuit court's suggestion that the lower court's analy- 
sis is deficient is correct for several reasons. It is meaningless to con- 
tend that Congress is not a political branch of the government, fully 
competent to determine matters of political judgment. Therefore, i t  
is clear that Congress as well as the President may declare that an 
emergency exists and take appropriate actionP1 Moreover, it  is not at  
all established that courts have no "official responsibility" in the mat- 
ter of determining the existence of a national emergencyP2 Although 
national emergencies under section 5 (b) are declared by the President, 
they are declared pursuant to authority delegated by Congress. And, 
of course, it is the "official responsibility" of courts to declare 
whether the executive branch is within its statutory or constitutional 
authority in taking a particular action. 
Just as in the district court decision in Werner, the court in 
30 119 F. Supp. at 896. ~ 
40 233 F.2d at 55 n.2. 
41 The Court approved legislation of this type in Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 13s 
. - ~. 
(1921). 
42 See Chastleton Corp. v. Siclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1923). 
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JfacEwan v.  refused to consider whether a declared national 
emergency continued to exist. There a declaratory judgment was 
sought to invalidate regulations of the Secretary of State which denied 
endorsement of passports for travel to and from Cuba. These regula- 
tions were based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
which provides that the President may restrict the travel of American 
citizens during a declared national emergencyF4 When the regula- 
tions were challenged on the ground that they were issued pursuant 
to the Korean emergency which no longer in fact existed, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit bluntly replied that "a court may 
not lightly hold that an executive proclamation of a national emer- 
gency has expired by lapse of time,"45 and concluded that, in any 
event, " [w] orld-wide events make it clear to everyone that the national 
emergency is not endedF4% 
Similarly, in Sardino v .  Federal Reserve the plaintiff chal- 
lenged the continued duration of the Korean emergency, contending 
that it could not support the Cuba embargo. Although Judge Friendly, 
writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, could easily 
have disposed of this question by ruling that the embargo was spe- 
cifically authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,48 he was 
not content to base his decision on this ground. Rather, he ruled 
against the plaintiff, for the reason that "courts will not review 'a 
determination so peculiarly within the province of the chief execu- 
tive . . . ."4e His ruling, that the determination of the existence of a 
national emergency is solely within the province of the President, 
comes closer to traditional doctrine than the rationale of the Werner 
and MacEwan courts. In  fact, this doctrine may be traced to Justice 
Story who, in 1812, said, "[ilt does not belong to the court to super- 
intend the acts of the executive, nor to decide on circumstances left 
to his sole discreti~n."~~ 
The reticence exhibited by the courts in reviewing the continued 
esistence of declared national emergencies results, as Judge Friendly 
indicated, from a reluctance to interfere in matters left to presidential 
discretion. In  this regard Professor Colvin has pointed out that judi- 
cial review has been of minor importance in delineating the scope of 
presidential powers: 
43 228 F. Supp. 306 (En. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Ci. 1965). 
44 8 U.S.C. 5 1185 (1964). 
45 228 F. Supp. at 312. 
40 Id. 
47 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966). 
48 22 U.S.C. 3 2364 (1964). See note 11, supra. 
49 361 F.2d at 109. However, he indicated that the existence of a national emergency 
could hardly be doubted when thousands of American troops mere in combat abroad and 
stationed in readiness around the globe. Id. 
~0 The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812). 
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While the Court has sometimes rebuffed presidential preten- 
sions, it has more often labored to rationalize them; but most 
of all it  has sought on one pretext or another to keep its sickle 
out of this "dread field."51 
This conclusion is based on a line of cases beginning in 1827 with 
Martin v.  M0tt,6~ wherein the President's power to call the militia 
into service during an invasion or threat of invasion, pursuant to a 
statute delegating him that power, was challenged by a militiaman 
who had been fined for refusing to answer such a call during the War 
of 1812. Justice Story asserted that the Court had no business second- 
guessing a determination made by the President concerning a matter 
left to his discretion by Congress.E3 This case has been cited in recent 
opinions which have refused to question the President's judgment 
concerning the existence of a national emergency.E4 
Constitutional attitudes have not remained static since 1827. In 
reviewing the evolution of judicial review of executive determinations, 
Professors Jaffe and Davis have stated that the attitudes and actions of 
the judiciary in regard to such review are Par from settled. In fact, they 
conclude that a presumption of reviewability has slo~vly emerged over 
the past few decades; a presumption which is rebuttable, however, 
by an indication of legislative intent to the contrary or a special reason 
for nonre~iewability.~~ 
One such basis for nonreviewability arises when the matter in 
question concerns foreign  affair^."^ It was for this reason that the 
Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.W and United States v. PinkG8 re- 
fused to review executive determinations concerning the recognition of 
foreign governments, and in Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 
S.S. Corp.E9 refused to review the President's determination that an 
international air route should be granted to one domestic air line 
rather than to another. The Court in the latter case said: 
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant in- 
formation, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the 
Executive taken on information properly held secret . . . . But 
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature 
51 E. Corwin, supra note 37, at  16. Professor Coxwin is not alone in making this ob- 
sewation. See aIso G. Schubert, The Presidency in the Courts 271 (1957). 
52 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
53 Id. at 27-28. 
54 See, e.g., Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 728, 732 (MD. Pa. 1943); United 
States v. Switchmens Union, 97 F. Supp. 97,101 (WD.N.Y. 1950). 
55 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law $8 28.01, .07 (1958) ; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control 
of Administrative Action, ch. 9 (1965). 
66 L. Jaffe, supra note 55 at 363-66. 
57 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
68 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
69 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
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of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not 
judicial. . . . They are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy. . . . They are decisions of a kind 
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor 
responsibility . . . .EO 
But these considerations are largely irrelevant to a judicial con- 
sideration of the continued existence of a national emergency, even 
if it  has been declared in response to international events. In  making 
such a determination a court does not act on incomplete information, 
for an emergency of the sort justifying the exercise of delegated emer- 
gency powers depends on apparent facts, which are readily ascertain- 
able without the sophisticated information-gathering apparatus avail- 
able to the President. In making such a determination, a court does 
not directly challenge a presidential decision, for the continued ex- 
istence of an emergency does not result as much from a presidential 
decision, that is, a conscious choice, as from inertia or the absence 
of any decision. 
In  the case of Chastleton Corp. v.  Sinclair? the Supreme Court 
not only indicated that judicial review of the continued existence of 
emergencies is proper, but ordered that the review be made. This 
case arose from a bill in equity to restrain the Rent Commissioner of 
Washington, D.C. from lowering rents for apartments in an order 
of August 7, 1922. The Rent Commission was created by Congress in 
1919 to deal with a housing shortage created by the vastly increased 
government personnel requirements during World War I. The measure 
was declared to be emergency legislation and was to terminate in 
two years unless repealed. When initially asked in Block v. Eirscho2 
to consider the deprivation of landlords' property rights by the rent 
control law, the Court was reluctant to question the emergency 
measure. "A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, may well 
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change."= 
However, when Congress extended the Act until 1924, Justice 
Holmes, in Chastleton, reiterated the Court's earlier statements re- 
garding the respect due congressional declarations of emergency, but 
qualified the extent to which such declarations would be respected. 
But even as to them a court is not at  liberty to shut its eyes 
to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends 
upon the truth of what is declared. . . . A law depending upon 
the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts 
60 Id. at  111. 
01 264 U.S. 543 (1923). 
02 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
03 Id. a t  157. 
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to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases 
or the facts change even though valid when passed.04 
But rather than determine itself whether an emergency con- 
tinued to exist, the Court remanded the case for that determination. 
Of course, the rent control regulations under consideration in Ckastle- 
ton were based upon a congressionally declared emergency, whereas 
the FDIR are based upon a presidentially declared emergency. But the 
reasoning of Holmes, quoted above, is equally applicable to both 
types of declarations. Moreover, regulations issued pursuant to sec- 
tion 5(b) depend on a delegation of authority from Congress. Pres- 
idential action pursuant to that delegation should be no more immune 
from judicial scrutiny than the underlying congressional action. If 
Congress' declaration of an emergency is reviewable, then the Pres- 
ident's declaration of an emergency when he is acting for Congress 
should also be reviewable. This position was supported by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in a footnote to its opinion in Werner v.  
United Statess6 wherein it indicated that it considered executive 
declarations of emergency, under proper circumstances, to be review- 
able: 
While the tendency is to leave the determination of the end of 
emergency to the executive branch, i t  is conceivable that in- 
ternational affairs could again achieve such placidity that a 
court could venture to take judicial notice that an emergency 
had ended, absent any such determination by the e~ecutive.0~ 
Later, in the case of Bauer v. United Stateso7 the court partially re- 
64 264 U.S. at 547-48. 
66 233 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1956). 
66 Id. at  55 31.2. 
67 244 F.2d 794 (9th Ci. 1957). 
In this 1957 case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to overturn a 
conviction for the possession of gold bullion in violation of the Gold Hoarding Reyla- 
tions issued under the authority of 2 5(b). Those regulations were challenged on the 
ground that the economic emergency of the Depression no longer e.hted and therefore 
no longer could justify criminal prosecutions in the 1950's. The court acknowledged the 
merit of this argument: 
It seems vital as a matter of national policy that emergency regulations and 
almost dictatorial powers granted or conceded in the turmoil of war, cold 
mar, economic revolution and the struggle to preserve a balanced democratic 
way of life, should be discarded upon return to normal conditions, lest we grow 
used to them as the fittings of ordinary existence. Executive regulations drafted 
and confumed for an emergency should expire with the emergency. There will 
be time enough to revivify these if another emergency requires and Congress be 
-ding. Of course, if it seems essential to continue the subject matter of these 
criminal regulations now, Congress can so declare. But the power lies in Congress. 
Id. a t  797. 
However, the court was un*g to follow the logic of this reasoning to its 
conclusion and refused to consider whether the Depression emergency had ended by 
1957. "This Court should not declare the end of any emergency as matter of law. Nor, 
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affirmed this position when it remanded the case for a determination of 
the continued existence of the Depression emergency. 
Finally, in 1962 the District Court for the Southern District of 
California judically noted the end of a presidentially declare6 national 
emergency in United States v.  Briddle.B8 This case arose from another 
conviction for the possession of gold bullion in violation of the same 
Gold Hoarding Regulations a t  issue in the Bauer case. The court 
declared: 
It is a simple matter, of course, to date the commence- 
ment of a "national emergency" by its declaration. But unless 
the ending be marked by proclamation also it is sometimes 
difficult indeed to determine. Yet, always a t  some point the 
"national emergency" does end, and the Orders which find 
their authority in the existence of the emergency lose their 
validity. . . . [I]t is now too clear for debate, as a matter 
of common knowledge, that the 1933 economic emergency 
ended long before 1962. Accordingly, this court should and 
does now judicially notice the fact.69 
Briddle was disapproved in United States v .  Lane70 and overruled 
in Pike v. United States.71 However, the basis of these later opinions 
was not that the Depression emergency survived and continued to jus- 
tify the Gold Hoarding Regulations, but rather that the regulations 
were supported by other, subsequently declared emergencies. Signif- 
icantly, the government conceded in the Pike case that the Depression 
emergency no longer existed, despite the failure of the President to ter- 
minate i t  formally. 
Emerging from this line of cases is judicial recognition of a fact 
that must have been obvious to  the general public throughout the 
1950's and 1960's: the Depression emergency no longer exists. A 
court has declared it so; the government has conceded the fact. This 
leads to the significant conclusion that declared national emergencies 
not only end when formally terminated by the President, as the World 
War I1 emergencies were terminated by President Truman in 1952,72 
except under most c~ceptional circumstances, should judicial notice be taken by us of 
conditions from which we might be indined to condude an emergency has ended?' Id. 
The court remanded the case for a finding on the issue. Id. 
8s 212 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Cal. 1962). 
09 Id. at 588-89. 
70 218 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
71 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965). 
T 2  Proclamation No. 2974,3 C J X .  158 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes pre- 
ceding § 1) (1964). 
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but also can die natural deaths. From this determination that an 
emergency can and does cease to exist when the conditions underlying 
it have disappeared, it  follows that the regulations dependent on that 
emergency should be considered terminated. If the President fails to 
act in this regard, it  is the duty of courts to do so. 
It must be admitted that the Depression emergency, under con- 
sideration in the Bauer and Briddle cases, was undeniably more 
dead in the 1950's than the Korean emergency, under consideration 
in the Sardino and MacEwan cases, was in the 1960's. The Depression 
emergency was declared solely in response to the economic crisis of 
the Depression-a crisis which had wholly passed by the mid-1950's. 
The Korean emergency, however, was declared in response to both 
the Chinese invasion of South Korea and "communist aggression" in 
general. While the Korean incident has receded far enough into the 
background so that i t  no longer merits national emergency status, and 
in any event bears no relation to the various regulations the Korean 
emergency now supports, the dangers of communist aggression, how- 
ever diminished, still exist and do bear a relation to many of these 
regulations. This raises the first question initially posed; whether 
potential communist aggression, as opposed to particular manifes- 
tations of communist aggression, is too general a matter to support 
the declaration of a national emergency. Today, when any hostile or 
even defensive act by an unfriendly nation may be labeled aggressive, 
and when any act of violence, internal or external, will be viewed 
by many to be communist inspired, any national emergency declared in 
response to potential communist aggression may well be viewed as 
continuous in na t~ re .7~  If Congress had intended to delegate the sec- 
tion 5 (b) powers in such an open-ended manner it would have done so 
by delegating them without the necessity of declaring a national emer- 
gency. However, since Congress delegated those powers only during 
time of war or national emergency it must have meant those phrases as 
limitations upon the president's authority. For these limitations to be 
meaningful the emergency must denote a crisis of sufficient specificity 
to have a definite, ascertainable end. If the operative language in the 
declaration of the Korean emergency includes all the dangers of com- 
munist aggression and not just the dangers surrounding the war crisis, 
that declaration may well be too intangible and too general to actually 
be a national emergency. 
The FDIR were issued by President Johnson to meet the bal- 
ance of payments problem. He issued them pursuant to his section 
73 That this seems to have been forgotten becomes apparent when one comes to 
realize that some 60% of the nation's population have lived their entire lives during n 
continuous, unbroken chain of national emergencies. Yet some of the years since 1933 
, have seemed relatively calm and no one continuing emergency has pervaded all of them. 
f 
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5(b) powers, under the presupposition that the Korean emergency 
continued to exist. If a court were to review the validity of the FDIR 
using the criteria suggested above, it might determine that the events 
underlying the Korean emergency no longer exist and, thus, no longer 
prevent Congress from fully and effectively legislating in regard to 
foreign investment by Americans. It could therefore be concluded that 
the Korean emergency no longer supports the issuance of the FDIR 
under section 5 (b). 
The second question initially posed and raised again by the Lane 
and Pike cases is: if a declared national emergency continues to exist, 
what regulations may it justify? Circumstances of varying types and 
severity, from near war to the flooding of the Ohio River, could jus- 
tify the declaration of a national emergency. Clearly, regulations jus- 
tified by a near war would not be responsive to, and therefore could 
not be justified by, an emergency declared in response to a regiona.1 
natural disaster, as this would be inconsistent with the rationale under- 
lying emergency delegation. Congress delegates those powers which, 
because of the particular emergency conditions involved, i t  cannot 
otherwise effectively exercise. While near war conditions might render 
it difficult for Congress to effectively regulate foreign commerce by 
preventing trade with and, hence, aid to a potential enemy, the flood- 
ing of the Ohio River obviously does not raise the same problems. 
Thus, the President's use of section 5(b) powers to regulate the flow 
of American goods abroad would be justified by near war, but not 
by a natural disaster. 
Since courts have not considered the rationale behind emergency 
delegation a t  any length, it is not surprising that they have failed to 
consider whether specific regulations are justified by the particular 
declared and esisting national emergencies underlying them. Thus, 
when the government admitted in the Pike case that the Depression 
emergency, pursuant to which the Gold Hoarding Regulations mere 
issued, no longer existed, the court found only that the Korean emer- 
gency still esisted. It did not consider whether those regulations were 
responsive to and justified by the conditions underlying the Korean 
emergency. Under its reasoning the regulations would, apparently, be 
equally well supported by any national emergency, including natural 
disasters. 
If the requirement of a logical relationship between a declared 
national emergency and the regulations issued under it is implicit in 
section S(b), it appears that many of the regulations outstanding 
under section 5 (b) are of questionable validity. Since the Depression 
emergency no longer exists and the World War I1 emergencies have 
been terminated, it  must be concluded that the FDIR and similar reg- 
ulations under section 5 (b), such as the Gold Hoarding Regulations, 
1.59 
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and the China and Cuba embargoe~?~ exist pursuant solely to the 
Korean emergency. Yet President Truman did not mention gold 
hoarding, Cuba or the balance of payments deficits in proclaiming 
the Korean emergency, and gold hoarding, Cuba and the balance of 
payments deficit seem to have little relation to events in Korea. Even 
potential communist aggression, if a term so broad can properly support 
a declaration of national emergency, seems to have little to do with 
gold hoarding or the balance of payments. Neither events in Korea 
nor potential communist aggression presently prevent Congress from 
conveniently and effectively dealing with the subjects of these various 
regulations. In  short, the issuance and continuance of these regula- 
tions pursuant to the Korean emergency seriously distort the rationale 
behind emergency delegation and may represent an abuse of dele- 
gated emergency powers. 
If a court were to judicially recognize the fact that the Korean 
emergency has ended, it  might be argued that the President, in effect, 
could make its decision moot by declaring a Vietnamese emergency 
and reissuing many of the present regulations pursuant to it. While 
this is true, i t  oversimplifies the situation. If the President were com- 
pelled to phase out declared national emergencies when the conditions 
underlying them disappear, several developments might occur. One is 
that for various periods of time there would probably be no declared 
national emergencies and, hence, no emergency regulations in existence. 
Presidents might also begin to issue responsive regulations pursuant 
to particular, clearly defined emergencies. Both of these developments 
are desirable for they focus attention on the fact that emergency 
delegation is not permanent but is intended to cease when emergency 
conditions disappear. 
The danger of allowing emergency powers to assume the nature 
of normal presidential powers is that this process contributes to the 
unfettered growth of concentrated power in the Chief Executive. Sec- 
tion 5(b) is just one of many statutes delegating emergency powers 
to the President, powers ranging from arming merchant vessels7G to 
imposing travel restrictions on American citi~ens.7~ It should be re- 
membered that the President alone determines when and under what 
conditions he may exercise the extraordinary powers delegated to him. 
He alone declares the existence of the national emergency which gives 
rise to such powers. In  making this declaration he is guided, if a t  all, 
only by the congressional guidelines suggested above, and is not re- 
quired by the judiciary to follow even these guidelines. If he disre- 
gards the intent of Congress, it can withdraw or modify the delegated 
74 See supra note 11. 
75 Act of June 29,1948 at ch. 715, 8 1,62 Stat. 1095 (repealed 1956). 
76 8 U.S.C. 5 1185 (1964). 
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powers only over a presidential veto. The dangers of this situation 
have not gone unrecognized. It was stated in the 1941 congressional 
debates relating to the amendment of section 5(b): "we have to 
retain power to control [the exercise of these delegated emergency 
powers] . . . and we have to retain the power to recapture and dis- 
tribute them when the emergency is over."77 I n  this regard the warn- 
ing issued by the Bauer court deserves close re-examination: 
It seems vital as a matter of national policy that emergency 
regulations and almost dictatorial powers granted or con- 
ceded in the turmoil of war, cold war, economic revolution 
and the struggle to preserve a balanced democratic way of 
life, should be discarded upon return to normal conditions, 
lest v e  grow used to them as the fittings of ordinary exis- 
t en~e .7~  
One respected student of executive authority has suggested that 
a constitutional dictatorship can be, has been, and under proper cir- 
cumstances should be, brought about through the use of such delega- 
tion of legislative a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  However, while Presidents have en- 
joyed relatively unfettered power during the Civil War and both 
world wars, and while such powers may be necessary during active 
wartime conflict, they are inappropriate when such conflict has passed 
or during an "emergency" which by its OWTI terms may never end 
despite the passing of the crisis associated with it. The dangers of 
broad delegations of emergency power could be reduced by providing 
for judicial review of emergency delegations under existing statutes. 
However, the position assumed by the courts indicates that judicial 
review in all situations, not just the obvious extremes, is unlikely 
to occur. A more effective approach may be the more careful structur- 
ing of statutes delegating emergency powers. Congress should estab- 
lish criteria for the declaration of a national emergency and should 
charge courts with the responsibility of reviewing regulations issued 
under an emergency to assure that those criteria are met and that the 
regulations are responsive to the emergency. Congress should also 
provide either that emergencies and regulations issued pursuant to 
them expire automatically after a short, stated period of time,sO or 
that Congress by joint resolution may terminate any delegation of 
77 87 Cong. Rec. 9858 (1941) (remarks of Congressman Sumnes) . 
78 244 F3d at 797. 
70 C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (1948). 
80 Limiting emergency delegations to a short stated period of time has a curious 
precedent in a practice of the Roman Republic which made prominent private citizens 
dictators in times of crisis but limited their terms to s i .  months and provided that they 
could not succeed themselves or that dictatoa could not exist for more than six months in 
a year. The sin month period is explained by the fact that the Romans fought only 
during the summer at that time. Id. at 23. 
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emergency powers, declared emergency, or regulation issued pursuant 
to such emergency. 
Congressional action to tighten control over the exercise of emer- 
gency powers delegated to the President must, of course, be based 
upon the existence of such powers in Congress. That is, the entire 
question of the extent of congressional control over such presidential 
actions depends upon whether the Constitution originally vests the 
power delegated in Congress or the President. Thus, before deterrnin- 
ing to what degree Congress can limit the exercise of section 5(b) 
powers by the President, it is necessary to determine the extent to 
which Congress or the President may constitutionally exercise the 
powers upon which the section focuses. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE EXECUTIVE'S 
E ~ R G E N C Y  POWERS 
There can be no doubt that Congress, under its war powersjgl can 
enact regulations of the sort contemplated in section S(b) during 
time of war. These war powers would also authorize such action during 
a war-related national emergency, when war appeared imminent or 
during the aftermath of war.82 At all other times Congress' foreign 
commerce and currency powersg3 would justify such action. Congress' 
ability under these powers to take actions of the sort contemplated in 
section 5 (b) has never been challenged. Its ability to delegate author- 
ity to the President to take such actions, however, has been challenged 
in cases arising under section 5 (b) regulations,s4 although these chal- 
lenges have been based on the now discredited doctrine that Congress 
may not delegate its "legislative" powers.8E 
81 "War powersJJ is used here to describe various powers given to Congress in the 
Constitution, including the powers to provide for the common defense, declare war, 
grant letters of marquis and reprisal, make rules concerning captures on land and sea, 
raise and support the army and navy, provide for the militia, call forth the militia, and 
make such laws as are necessary and proper to carry out those powers. U.S. Const. 
art. II, 3 8. 
82 See Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947). 
While a natural hesitancy exists against so interpreting the war power clause 
as to expand its scope to cover incidents not intimately connected with war, we 
think reasonable preparation for the storm of war is a proper exercise of the war 
power. This seizure of alien property, in a time of emergency, is of that 
character. 
Id. a t  476. 
83 These include the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, coin money, 
regulate the value of foreign and domestic money and make such laws as are necessary 
and proper to carry out those powers. U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8. 
84 Teague v. Regional CommJr of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Sardino 
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Von Clemm, 136 
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1943). 
85 The idea that Congress cannot delegate its "legislativeJJ function may be traced 
back a t  least to John Locke. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, ch. XI 
(1690). But it did not receive judicial sanction until the 19301s, when the Supreme Court 
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The Constitution also vests certain mar powers in the President, 
the most notable of which is his designation as commander in chief 
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 in the "Hot Oil" and "Sick 
Chicken" cases. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ; Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court reasoned in both of these 
cases that Congress had delegated such sweeping powers, without setting any standards 
for the exercise of them, that i t  had abdicated its legislative responsibilities and thereby 
violated the principle of separation of powers. The Court has not applied these cases or 
the reasoning behind them since the 1930's. When the question of delegation of powers 
is raised i t  is customarily disposed of by finding that Congress has provided reasonable 
standards for the exercise of the delegated power, thus establishing the policy and goal 
for the regulations to be promulgated, and merely delegating the ministerial function 
of specific application. But since the standards recognized as reasonable have been so 
broad as to be meaningless in determining the scope and content of regulations pro- 
mulgated pursuant to them, see K. Davis, supra note 55, a t  8 2.03, it must be concluded 
that the Court has turned its back on the "Hot O i i  and "Sick Chicken" cases. Professor 
Davis goes to the length of suggesting that a lawyer does a disservice to hi client by 
raising the delegation issue. Id. S. 2.01, and Professor Convin believed that "[nleither 
of these precedents materially influenced Congressional policy even at  the time, and both 
have been subsequently relegated by the Court to its increasingly crowded cabinet of 
juridical curiosities." E. Convin, supra note 37, a t  127. But Profesor Jaffe is not as 
certain that the doctrine is dead: 
Undoubtedly i t  can be argued that considered realistically, Schechter has been 
put in the museum of constitutional history. But granting the existence of a 
doctrine limiting delegation (and almost no court has ever denied it), the 
doctrine is intelligible only in terms of the degree of delegation which the 
judiciary regards as appropriate in the circumstances. There are still differences 
of degree between the NRA on the one hand and the AA and the OPA on the 
other. Those c~amples suggest-and there are others including projected 
legislation not passed-that Schechter prods Congress into awareness of its 
responsibility for bringing major policy decisions into focus. 
L. Jaffe, supra note 55, at 71-72. 
To the extent that there is a doctrine limiting the delegation of legislative power, 
i t  would not affect S 5(b) since that section has to do with foreign affairs, in which 
great latitude is generally allowed. This was clearly enunciated by the landmark case, 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The case was an appeal 
from an indictment for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia, in violation of a Joint 
Resolution of Congress. The Resolution prohibited the sale of arms to Bolivia and two 
countries then at  war, and delegated to the President the power to limit the application 
of and make exceptions to the Resolution. The Resolution by its terms became effective 
only when the President, after consultation with the assurances of cooperation from 
other American countries, found that such prohibition would contribute to the re- 
establishment of peace and so proclaimed. The President's Proclamation recited that 
the consultations had been made, the assurances of cooperation received, and that the 
embargo would contribute to the re-establishment of peace. It then delegated to the 
Secretary of State the power to prescribe exceptions and limitations to the Resolution. 
The Resolution was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the 
Presideht. 
The Court began its analysis by assuming that the Resolution would have been 
unconstitutional had i t  related solely to internal affairs (on the assumption that the 
doctrines of separation of powers and of nondelegation of legislative power would 
govern). But i t  found a signijicant difference between the powers of the federal govern- 
ment with respect to internal and external affairs. The internal powers were carved out 
of legislative powers originally possessed by the states but given to the Congress in the 
Constitution. The external powers, however, were composed of various manifestations of 
external sovereignty, not possessed by the states prior to the Constitution, and of which 
only a few were specifically conferred on Congr- or the President in the Constitution. 
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of the nation's armed f0rces.8~ This designation was originally thought 
of in purely military terms. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist: 
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same as 
that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much in- 
ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the su- 
preme command and direction of the military and naval 
forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy: 
while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war 
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies.s7 
The commander in chief clause was largely neglected as a source 
of presidential power until the weeks following the fall of Fort 
Sumter when President Lincoln, without congressional authority, 
"summoned troops and paid them out of the Treasury without appro- 
As to them the Court found that "if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution 
[they] would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality." Id. a t  318. The Court found that these external, foreign relations powers 
vested in the President rather than in Congress as a result of the nature of their respec- 
tive offices. The Court found it was 
[dlealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an eyertion 
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plennry 
and excIusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government 
in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as n basis 
for its exercise an act of Congress. 
Id. a t  319-20. 
Since many of the external, foreign relations powers are vested in the President, Congress 
is unrestricted in delegating to him such external, foreign relations powers as are vested 
in it. 
The Joint Resolution under consideration in the Curtiss-Wright case was, of course, 
far different in nature from 5 5(b). It related to a s p e s c  event, whereas f 5(b) is 
open-ended. It related to a particular type of trade with particular nations, whereas 
5 5(b) relates to any or all trade with any or dl nations. It established particular 
prohibitions, whereas 5 J(b) leaves i t  to the President to do so. Nevertheless the rationnle 
of the Curtiss-Wright case has been uniformly accepted as establishing that Congress has 
virtually unlimited discretion in delegating foreign affairs powers to the President, 
despite the limited delegation of power under consideration in that case. The second 
circuit rested on this reading of the Curtiss-Wright case when the Cuba embargo mas 
challenged as an exercise of unconstitutionally delegated power in Sardino v. Federal 
Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966). 
The claim that the statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power is foreclosed by United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. . . . Although 
the delegation there sustained was narrower than that in 3 J(b) of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, the CourtJs opinion was not thus circumscribed. 
Id. a t  110. 
86 These indude the designation of the President as  the commander in chief of the 
armed forces, the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, 
the power to appoint officers, and the duty to faithfully execute the laws. U.S. Const. 
art. 11, 35 2, 3. 
87 The Federalist No. 69, a t  417-18 (C. Rossiter ed. 1969) (A. Hamilton). 
There is evidence that debate a t  the Philadelphia convention over the clause and 
a t  sessions of state legislatures held to consider ratification of the Constitution centered 
on the advisability of allowing the President to expose himself to the dangers inherent in 
physically leading his troops in battle. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 530 
(1937). 
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priation therefor . . . proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederacy 
and seized ships violating that blockade."88 Such actions clearly in- 
volved matters normally governed by the powers to call the militia 
into service, to make appropriations, to declare war and to regulate 
captures on land and sea-powers vested by the Constitution in 
C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  
Lincoln justified his actions partly on the basis that Congress 
was not in session a t  the time and that the preservation of the Union 
required that they be taken. This justification is somewhat belied by 
the fact that even after Congress was assembled, Lincoln continued 
to use the new-found presidential war powers rather than seek a 
delegation of congressional authority or wait for congressional ac- 
tion. In  addition, the President later instituted a military draft, 
proclaimed a national suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and 
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, all without congressional 
authorizationPo 
Subsequent war Presidents have not relied on their powers as 
commander in chief to the same extent because Congress delegated 
broad war powers to them in such statutes as the Trading with the 
Enemy ActP1 But in regard to matters not covered by such statutes, 
Presidents have continued to take actions within the constitutional 
competence of Congress, relying on presidential war powers. Thus, 
without any statutory justification, President Wilson created the War 
Labor Board to prevent strikes and lockouts from interfering with 
the production of goods needed for the war effort during World War 
and President Roosevelt created several agencies to deal with 
various aspects of the crisis during World War II?3 President Roose- 
8s Youngstom Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 685 (1952) (Vinson, 
C. J., Reed, & Minton, J. J., dissenting). 
83 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
00 6 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 96-99, 120 (1911). See 
generally C. Rossiter, supra note 79, for a concise account of President Lincoln's extra- 
ordinary presidential activities. 
01 Statutes of particular importance in this regard include: National Defense Act 
of June 3, 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166; Lever Act (Food Control) of Aug. 10, 1917, ch. 
53, 40 Stat. 276; Selective Training and Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 
885; Lend-Lease Act of March 11,1941, ch. 11,55 Stat. 31 (codified a t  22 U.S.C. $5 411-19 
(1964)) ; Emergency Price Control Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 ; and, Second 
\Var Powers Act of March 27, 1942, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176 (codified at  1 2  U.S.C. $ 355 
(1964); 49 U.S.C. $$ 304-10a, 911 (1964) ; 50 U.S.C. App. $3 643-43c, 645-45b, 1152 
(1964)). 
02 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,693 (1952). 
03 Professor Convin received a statement from the Executive Office of the President 
in April of 1942 listing 35 agencies of "purely presidential creation." In  creating most 
of the agencies the President had invoked his powers as commander in chief and under 
the F i s t  War Powers Act. But since several of the agencies mere created before that 
Act and the Act did not authorize the creation of new offices but only a redistribution 
of functions, these actions were based primarily on the President's constitutional powers. 
E. Convin, supra note 37, at  242-43. 
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velt also seized various industrial plants prior to the Japanese inva- 
sion of Pearl Harbor when strikes threatened to disrupt the produc- 
tion of needed war  material^?^ No statute authorized such seizures, 
but the President justified them by citing his constitutional war 
p ~ w e r s ? ~  
.2 A relatively recent example of the attempted use of these powers 
was President Truman's seizure of the steel industry to prevent a 
nation-wide steel strike during the Korean in~ident.0~ Although the 
Court denied him the power to make this seizure in Youngstown Sheet 
63 Tube Co. v.  Sawyerg7 (((Steel Seizure" case) the consensus of the 
94 Youngstom Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,621 (1952). 
95 89 Cong. Rec. 3992 (1943) (statement by the Attorney General read into the 
record by Senator Barkley) . 
96 Exec. Order No. 103443 C3.R. 861 (Comp. 1949-53). 
97 343 US. 579 (1952). The holding of this case and its value as precedent are 
difficult to determine since each of the six justices in the majority wrote a separate 
opinion. 
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, rested on the proposition that 
Congress could have seized the steel mills and insofar as it could have done so, the 
President could not do so. To support this proposition Justice Black adduces the 
doctrine of separation of powers, citing no precedent or governmental practice. The 
dissenting opinion, however, recites a long list of presidential actions, dating back to 
Washington's Declaration of Neutrality during the French Revolution taken without 
congressional authorization and judicial precedents supporting such actions. Justice 
Black's opinion was, as is pointed out by Professor Convin, earmarked by "hasty im- 
provisation as well as . . . [by] strong prepossession, being unquestionably contradicted 
by a long record of presidential pioneering in temtory eventually occupied by Congress!' 
E. C o d ,  supra note 37, at  155. 
The opinions of the other justices constituting the majority generally developed 
two lines of reasoning. They regarded the seizure in question as an exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, a legislative function, and therefore a power vested by the 
Constitution in Congress rather than in the President. Although they generally conceded 
that the President had such extraordinary powers in time of emergency and war that he 
might, under some circumstances, justliably affect the seizure in question, they agreed 
I that such circumstances did not exist. They also looked to Congressional measures 
affecting the question: the Taft-Hartley Act for settling labor disputes, which did not 
include seizure as an authorized method of resolution, and the Selective Service Act of 
1948 and the Defense Production Act of 1956, which did authorize seizure to end labor 
disputes. From these and other acts they concluded that Congress had disapproved of 
seizure as a method of resolving labor disputes except in certain specified circum- 
stances. 
The dissenting opinion develops the case for the existence of an emergency power 
in the President. I t  centers on a recitation of presidential actions, dating to Jirashington's 
Proclamation of Neutrality during the French Revolution, taken without congressional 
authorization, and on judicial precedents supporting those actions, Besides stressing the 
President's powers as commander in chief, it points out that the president had the 
constitutional duty to faithfully execute numerous statutes for which the continued 
production of steel was necessary. The dissenting justices felt that the existing inter- 
national crisis, which was aggravated by the steel stoppage, transcended the situations 
which the Taft-Hartley Act was designed to meet and justified the exercise of the Presi- 
dent's emergency powers. That the dissent has a certain logic to i t  is suggested by the 
fact that i t  is the only opinion in which three justices could concur. The inability of the 
justices to agree on any one rationale for deciding the case indicates that the decision 
will likely be confined to its facts in the future. 
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six separate opinions of the justices in the majority seems not to deny 
that the President can take such actions under appropriate circum- 
stances, but that Congress had already "occupied the field" with the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and had thereby dictated the procedures 
the President was to follow in resolving labor disputes. 
The President's war powers, and particularly his designation as 
commander in chief, may enable him during wartime to take many ~ 
of the actions contemplated in section 5(b) without delegation from 
Congress of the power to do so. Regulations typified by the China 
embargo and the FDIR certainly could bear as close a relation to, and 
be as important to the prosecution of, a war as the actions cited above 
of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. The same rea- 
sons that justify congressional action pursuant to congressional war 
powers during war-related national emergencies, when war appears 
imminent and during the aftermath of war, also justify presidential 
action pursuant to presidential war powers during such times. In  this 
regard it should be noted that many of the examples of the President's 
use of his war powers cited above occurred in times other than during 
a declared war. 
It stretches the imagination, however, to assert that the President 
may, a t  any time, issue regulations such as the 'FDIR in reliance on 
his powers as commander in chief. In  the absence of imminent mar 
such measures appear to be concerned solely with international trade 
and the national economy. The Constitution does not vest any powers 
with regard to foreign commerce or currency in the President. These 
are given solely to Congress, and Congress' control over them is con- 
sidered plenary?$ It would follow, therefore, that except as the Pres- 
ident could justify his actions by his war powers, he could justify 
issuing regulations of the type contemplated in section 5 (b) only by a 
congressional delegation of authority to him. In  this regard it was 
held in United States v .  Guy W .  Capps, I ~ G ? ~  that insofar as foreign 
commerce is concerned: 
0s Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). The foreign 
commerce power would easily encompass the types of regulations envisaged by 8 5(b). 
The power comprehends "every species of commercial intercourse between the United 
States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and 
any other, to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said, that commerce, 
as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by 
the term!' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824). 
90 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). This case arose under an executive agreement with 
Canada requiring that all contracts to export potatoes from Canada to the United States 
contain provisions that such potatoes would be used for seed rather than table purposes 
in the United States. This agreement was reached in conjunction with the Agricultural 
Act of July 3, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1248, under which the government 
committed itself to purchase all domestically produced table potatoes that could not be 
sold a t  parity price for such price. The government sought damages for the breach 
of such a provision in an export contract. The court could have decided the case on the 
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While the President has certain inherent powers under the 
Constitution such as the power pertaining to his position as 
. Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and the power 
necessary to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the 
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not 
among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is ex- 
pressly vested by the Constitution in Congress.100 
This reasoning drams considerable support from early judicial 
attitudes toward the regulation of foreign commerce. During the 
, French and English conflicts of the early nineteenth century,lOl courts 
faced the question whether the President could implement an embargo 
in the absence of congressional delegation of the authority to do so. 
To provide an incentive for recognition of America's rights as a neu- 
tral during those conflicts, Congress enacted an embargo against both 
belligerents but provided that the President could suspend its opera- 
tion against either country if  and when he had reason to believe that 
that country would observe American rights.lo2 At one point the 
British Ambassador to the United States purported to arrange for 
British recognition of American neutral rights and President Madison 
suspended the embargo against England by proclamation on April 19, 
1809. The British government, however, disavowed the arrangements. 
President Madison therefore revived the embargo against England by 
proclamation on August 19, 1809, although the embargo statute did 
more narrow ground of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 519, since 
Congress had clearly set out in the Act a procedure for dealing with the problem of 
'imports other than the one the President adopted. The Act provided that if imports 
interfered with the program the President could direct the Tariff Commission to hold 
public hearings and could, based on the findings of the Commksion, prohibit within 
certain percentage limits such interfering imports by proclamation. 
100 204 F.2d at  659. 
101 At thii time both contending European powers so violated the right of neutral 
shippers, i.e., of American merchantmen, that America was at  times on the brink of 
war with each. Violations included the impressment of American seamen into the 
English navy and the seizure of American ships and cargos hound to the other power. 
Indignation over impressment reached its climax in 1807 when the British warship 
H.M.S. Leopard attacked and boarded the U.S.S. Chesapeake and seized three crewmen. 
With Congress on the point of declaring war against England after this incident, 
President Jefferson decided that economic retaliation would be more appropriate and 
effective than military action and asked instead for an embargo against both England and 
France. Although the embargo was an economic disaster for the maritime regions of 
the country and politically disastrous for Jefferson's followers in those regions, it was 
periodically renewed until the underlying European conflict was resolved and outrages 
to American merchantmen consequently ceased. See L. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo 
(1966) ; E. Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Export (1941). 
102 Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506. A series of embargo acts, listed below, 
beginning in 1806 succeeded one another with evolution to this act. Act of Apr. 18, 1806, 
ch. 29, 2 Stat. 379; Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451; Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch, 8, 
2 Stat. 453; Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 
473. 
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not provide a revival procedure. In a case arising from seizures pur- 
suant to this reimposed embargo, Justice Story held in The Orom 
that the President had no inherent power to regulate foreign commerce 
by reviving the embargo, and that the statute had conferred no such 
power on him?03 
The inference in The Orono that Congress could delegate power 
to the President to regulate foreign commerce was verified by the 
Court in The Brig Auroru.lo4 This case involved a challenged seizure 
under a later embargo act which provided that an embargo against 
either England or France would arise only when the President deter- 
mined that the other belligerent had ceased to violate neutral rights. 
President Madison determined and proclaimed on November 2, 1810, 
that France had ceased to violate neutral rights whereas England had 
not, thus raising the embargo against England. English cargo from 
the Aurora was seized pursuant to the embargo so created. The Court 
held that when Congress has the power to enact a measure such as 
an embargo, it has the concomitant power to make the effectiveness of 
that measure contingent on the occurrence of a certain event, includ- 
ing a proclamation by the President. It appears from these two cases 
that early judges believed that the President could not regulate for- 
eign commerce in his o m  right, but that Congress could do so through 
any vehicle it chose, including a presidential proclamation. Although 
this inference lends some support to the theory of the Capps opinion, 
several trends in constitutional interpretation and analysis since 1813 
render that opinion doubtful, especially as it might be precedent for 
actions of the kind taken under section 5 (b). 
The possibility of presidential actions that may usurp Congress' 
power to regulate foreign commerce in time of war or war-related 
national emergency has already been discussed, but congressional 
power to regulate foreign commerce in peace time also may be affected 
by the President's foreign relations powers. These powers derive 
from the Constitution and include the President's powers to make 
treaties, appoint ambassadors and receive foreign ambassadors.lo5 
The President's special role in foreign affairs was recognized very 
early in the country's history. In  an argument on the floor of the 
House of Representatives in 1800 John Marshall said, "the Pres- 
ident is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its 
sole representative with foreign nations."lo8 
- -  ~ 
103 The Orono, 18 I?. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812); see also 
President's Proclamation Declared Illegal, 19 F. Cas. 1289 (No. 11,391) (C.C.D.N.C. 
1812). 
104 The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). This case 
has become the basis for holding that contingency legislation is constitutionally justified. 
106 U S .  Const. art. 11, 3 2. 
106 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800). 
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Although this theory had its passionate adherents at  the time,lo7 
and approximates reality today, it  did not accurately reflect the dis- 
tribution of powers made a t  the Philadelphia Convention. While the 
President is given the power to make treaties and appoint ambas- 
sadors, he can exercise that power only with the consent of the Sen- 
ate?08 Although he can shape foreign policy, he can implement it only 
with appropriations from Congress.loa And Congress is vested with 
the powers to regulate foreign commerce, lay duties, establish rules 
of naturalization, define offenses against the Law of Nations and 
with the ultimate power in respect to relations with foreign coun- 
tries-the power to declare war?1° In making this distribution of 
powers, the founding fathers departed markedly from the political 
philosophers they followed in other respects, Locke and Montesquieu, 
who placed the direction of foreign relations solely in the executive 
branch?ll 
In  practice the direction of foreign affairs has tended to shift be- 
tween the executive and legislative branches a t  particular times, but 
the executive has become progressively more dominant, so that today 
the President does assume supreme powers in the sphere of foreign 
relations. He has successfully by-passed many of the foreign relations 
powers vested by the Constitution in Congress. Where the Senate 
must confirm ambassadorial appointments, the President may send 
his personal emissaries on diplomatic missions without Senate ap- 
prova1?l2 Where the Senate must confirm treaties, the President may 
enter an executive agreement without Senate approval and achieve 
the same result as with a treaty?13 Where Congress must declare war, 
- 
107 For an account of the sharp debate between Hamilton, a proponent of this view, 
and Madison, an opponent of this view, see E. Conrin, supra note 37, at  177-84. 
108 U.S. Const. art. II, 3 2. 
109 U.S. Const. art. I, 3 8. 
110 U.S. Const. art, I, 3 8. 
111 J. Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government $3 145-46, 148 (1690); C. 
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws ch. 6 (1748). 
112 Thus, in 1791 President IVashington deputized Gouverneur Morris to confer 
with the British government regarding the Treaty of Paris. Perhaps the most famous 
presidential emissary was Colonel House, President Wilson's man in Europe. President 
Nixon's recent dispatch of Governor Rockefeller to Latin America confirms that the 
practice is still very much alive. 
113 The Senate's roll in advising the President on treaties foundered in the first 
instance. When President Washington attempted to consult in person with the Senate 
regarding the terms of a proposed treaty with southern Indians, the Senate spent 
its energy debating the procedural manner in which i t  mould advise the President, 
rather than debating the substance of the treaty. It finally referred the matter to a 
committee and toId the President to return another day. E. Convin, supra note 7, at 
209-10. The advice and consent of the Senate proved so cumbersome in instances where 
time was of the essence, or in matters involving great technicality, that Presidents 
soon began to define American relations with foreib- nations by c~ecutive agreements 
rather than by treaties, for executive agreements have the great advantage of neces- 
sitating no action by the Senate. But they are subject to abuse, enabling Presidents 
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the President may achieve the same result without Senate approval 
simply by sending troops into combat using his powers as com- 
mander in chief?14 Although alarm is frequently expressed over the 
President's increasing disregard of Congress in formulating foreign 
policy, i t  is sometimes difficult to determine whether this alarm 
merely expresses basic disagreement with the President's policies 
rather than with his disregard of the constitutional distribution of 
powers?l6 
The President's special competence in foreign relations is well 
recognized by the judiciary. In  the landmark case of United States v. 
Czfrtiss-Wright Export Corp.,l1° the Court found that the President 
has "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations-a 
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress . . . ."l17 The Court believed this to be an appropriate allo- 
cation of power, for the President 
not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the con- 
ditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is 
, this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of 
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, con- 
sular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information 
gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the prema- 
ture disclosure of its productive or harmful results?18 
to do what has been espressiy denied them the power to do. Theodore Roosevelt, for 
instance, entered into an executive agreement with bankrupt Santo Domingo to run 
that nation's customs system with American personnel to prevent its European creditors 
from seizing the system after the Senate had failed to consent to a treaty to the same 
effect. Id. at  212. And the Supreme Court has held that despite their possible abuses, 
c~ecutive agreements are nevertheless the law of the land, as are treaties. United States 
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
114 Presidential actions in sending combat troops to Vietnam, Thailand, the 
Dominican Republic and Korea in recent years are just the latest in a long series of 
such actions. The power of a President to involve the nation in what can real- 
i s t i d y  only be called a war has not gone completely unquestioned. See Holrnes v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Youngstom Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). A court has 
nevertheless sanctioned the executive's use of force abroad without the prior consent 
of Congress. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4,186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860). 
115 Thus, Senator Fulbright's well-known attempts to reassert the power of the 
Senate over the direction of foreign policy are an interesting volte-face from his 
earlier view that the President's abiity to pursue an effective and coherent foreign 
policy was hamstrung by the fragmentation of foreign policy powers among a variety 
of Congressional committees. See Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Cen- 
tury under an 18th Century Constitution, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1961). This transition 
may reflect the Senator's growing disenchantment with our involvement in Vietnam. 
11% 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
117 Id. a t  320. 
118 Id. See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 111 (1948). 
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I n  addition to the President's superior access to information and the 
frequent necessity to keep such information secret, as The Federalist 
papers point out, he is also better suited to conduct the nation's foreign 
affairs than Congress because he may speak with one voice rather than 
many, and because he is capable of continuous action rather than being 
in frequent adjournment?lg 
But in taking an action pursuant to his foreign relations powers the 
President does not thereby preclude Congress from the exercise of its 
constitutional powers. Congress may use these powers to limit a 
President's choices in formulating foreign policy. No President, for 
instance, can formulate an expansive foreign aid program if Congress 
will not appropriate funds for foreign aid.120 And if any message 
emerges from the "Steel Seizure" case, it  is that once Congress has ex- 
pressed its will in regard to a matter within its constitutional grant of 
power, its determination will be binding on the President. As Justice 
Jackson stated in his concurring opinion: 
When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is a t  its 
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his o m  constitu- 
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress 
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential 
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at  once 
so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, 
for what is a t  stake is the equilibrium established by our con- 
stitutional systern.121 
This reasoning applies equally well whether the President is act- 
ing pursuant to his war powers or his foreign relations powers. As a 
practical matter, however, courts will defer considering the constitu- 
tional validity of presidential actions taken during war, and pur- 
portedly pursuant to the President's war powers, until the war crisis 
is passed.'22 Courts will not necessarily accord such deference to ac- 
tions taken pursuant to the President's foreign relations powers. 
-- - - - -- 
1.19 The Federalist, supra note 87, Nos. 69 and 75. Of course this is not unlike the 
justification for the delegation of legislative power to the executive generally. See L. 
Jaffe, supra note 55, a t  33-40. 
120 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), where the Court 
stated: "[Tlhe conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the 
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative Departments . . . of the Govern- 
ment." See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 1967), 
in which the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper Amendment was upheld despite its 
interference mith the President's "delicate, plenary and exclusive" power over foreign 
relations. 
121 Youngstom Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952). 
122 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) ; Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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From this analysis it appears that the President and Congress 
have "concurrent powers" over the substantive matters on which regu- 
lations are contemplated under section 5 (b) . The President's claims 
to such powers are stronger during war or war-related emergencies 
than during peace. Thus, in time of war the President probably has 
the power under the war clauses to issue many regulations of the sort 
contemplated by section 5(b), including the FDIR, even without a 
specific delegation of power from Congress. If his power to do so is 
not clearly established courts nevertheless are unlikely to question 
the authority of the President while the crisis in response to which 
he has acted still exists. In time of national emergency the President 
has similar power, and although it may be more restricted than in time 
of war, the extent of the restriction is unclear and may even be in- 
significant in the "cold war" context. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the Constitution vests primary 
responsibility for effecting measures of the type contemplated in 
section 5 (b), including the FDIR, in Congress rather than in the 
President. As a consequence, the President may be precluded from 
taking many such measures in time of peace without congressional 
authorization. Insofar as those measures affect foreign relations and 
have not been dealt with by prior congressional action, however, the 
President may have authority to act in regard to them pursuant to his 
foreign relations power, even in time of peace. The measures con- 
templated in section 5(b) and contained in the FDIR are, therefore, 
within the area of the concurrent powers of Congress and the President 
in time of war and, to a lesser extent, in time of peace. But since they 
are primarily within the constitutional grant of power to Congress, 
Congress' will should prevail over the President's in case of a con- 
frontation between the two. 
Since most of these measures are necessarily of a fluid and highly 
complex nature requiring quick responses to changing conditions and 
technical evaluations of existing conditions, they are of the type which 
must be exercised by the executive, whether by the President's own 
initiative or pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. On the 
other hand, since they have a potentially pervasive effect on the nation's 
entire economy and on the rights and privileges of its citizenry, under 
traditional democratic philosophy, the legislative branch of government 
should exercise ultimate control over their dimension and contour. 
Congress has clearly taken the first step in this direction by delegating 
the section 5 (b) powers to the President. Regardless of the uncertainty 
as to the limitations of the President's power under section 5(b), it is 
clear from the existence of section 5(b) that he exercises that power 
under a mandate from, and as an agent of, Congress. Congress has 
provided guidelines for the exercise of that power only by inference, 
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and any attempt to establish guidelines for, or to revoke the delegation 
of power in, section 5(b) can be accomplished only over the presiden- 
tial veto. While it is unlikely that such a veto is politically possible 
in normal times, it is quite likely that i t  could be politically justified 
in times of crisis. 
In  order to retain control over the power vested in it by the 
Constitution and to remove the temptation of potentially dictatorial 
power from the President, Congress should act to restrict the exercise 
of power delegated in section 5(b) and of similar emergency powers 
delegated to the President. Such action could take the form of legisla- 
tion which would: (1) require that the President activate delegated 
emergency powers by declaring national emergencies only under es- 
tablished criteria; (2) require that regulations be promulgated pur- 
suant to particular emergencies and be responsive to the conditions 
leading to the declarations of those emergencies; (3) provide for the 
automatic termination of declared emergencies and regulations promul- 
gated pursuant to them after a stated period of time unless they are 
redeclared and repromulgated pursuant to the same criteria; (4) 
charge the courts with the responsibility of reviewing the declarations 
and redeclarations of emergencies and the promulgations and repromul- 
gations of regulations pursuant to those emergencies to assure that they 
conform to the established criteria; and (5) provide that Congress, by 
joint resolution, may terminate any delegated emergency power as 
well as any emergency declared pursuant to such power and regulation 
promulgated pursuant to such emergency. Congressional action to 
tighten its control over the delegation of emergency powers in section 
5(b) should evidence a congressional "occupation of the field" and 
preclude, a t  least during peacetime, presidential action except as 
authorized and directed by Congress. 
I ,  
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